Political Culture Lecture Series: Stephen Welsh - "Political Culture, Democracy and Democratic Crisis"

From the Standing Group on Political Culture.

Stephen Welch (Durham University): “Political Culture, Democracy and Democratic Crisis”
February 21, 12 pm CET (UTC+1), Zoom

Abstract: Not long after the concept of political culture was introduced into political science, its first use, in the well-known study The Civic Culture, was to describe the supposed cultural prerequisites of democracy. In this approach, a certain type of political culture was found to be conducive to democracy, and others not. The approach was extended to studies of non-democracies of the ‘Third World’, and later to communist states.

As democracy became more consolidated in previously questionable cases such as that of West Germany, a more ‘developmental’ analysis emerged. Two influential versions of this were the theory of ‘cognitive mobilization’ (CM) and the theory of ‘post-materialism’ (PM). Here the focus was not on categorical differences between democracies and non-democracies, but on changes within democracies, especially the extension and intensification of democratic participation. Democracy was supposed, by CM theory, to be reinforced by improvements in education and in the circulation of information; and in PM theory by a change in ‘values’ brought about by sustained peace and economic growth under democratic governments.

A third phase has begun in the last decade, somewhat reviving the anxieties about democratic fragility that fuelled the first one. Variously described as populism, demagoguery or even neo-fascism, these developments necessitate a further revision of analytical and causal frameworks. The PM theory has embraced the notion of ‘backlash’, which, however, sits uncomfortably with its earlier claims. The CM theory looks implausible in the era of ‘post-truth’ politics, but the contradiction can arguably be resolved by considering that democratic impulses themselves contribute to a collapse of deference towards cognitive authorities such as scientists and mainstream media – a dynamic I have described as ‘hyperdemocracy’. Such a theoretical shift requires a shift in emphasis in the conceptualization of political culture, towards its cognitive component, or dimension – which was always part of its definition (typically under the heading of ‘beliefs’), but tended to be displaced as an empirical focus by the component of values. Such a shift would also entail an interest in the ‘infrastructure’ of culture, in this case the institutions of fact-establishment and transmission. A number of new lines of inquiry in political culture research would thereby open up.

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