A Politicized Broker?: Linking Intra-Commission and Inter-Institutional Policy-Making

While agenda-setting power of the EU Commission is discussed controversially, there is wide agreement that brokerage is key to these powers. Yet, it is unclear analytically and empirically how brokerage is affected by politicization and conflict. This paper combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of nine legislative proposals to analyse the broker role empirically. Commission proposals are the endpoints of complex internal processes that are frequently politicized. Linking intra-Commission and inter-institutional policy-making the paper asks what structures conflict inside the Commission and whether this resembles conflict structures in the inter-institutional process. It is shown that duration of intra- and inter-institutional negotiations is strongly correlated. Conflict lines in the intra- and inter-institutional process often, but not exclusively evolve around the same issues. These findings contribute to a more detailled understanding of the broker role the Commission holds and its agenda-setting power in the EU system.