Framing to Ovecome a Dominant Coalition’s Resistance to Changes in Regulatory Institutions

This paper examines the role of framing in overcoming a dominant coalition’s resistance to reforming regulatory institutions. The March 2011 nuclear accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi power plant eroded trust in Japan’s nuclear safety administration and sparked a phase-out debate. Japan’s powerful pro-nuclear coalition, comprised of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), and the nuclear industry, prevented a nuclear phase out. However, an ad-hoc coalition of change agents still pushed through safety regulation reforms that created an independent regulatory institution dedicated to oversight and transparency, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), in a formerly closed corporatist energy policy environment. Japan’s devastating nuclear accident and subsequent continuation of nuclear energy policy with major reforms in regulatory institutions provides an intriguing test case for policy change theories. The paper shows that learning and subsequent reframing of the accident shifted the power balance in favor of institutional change agents. Methodologically, the research used process tracing to analyze extensive field-based interviews as well as analysis of primary and secondary sources in Japanese. According to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, external or internal shocks open a window of opportunity for major policy change by potentially drawing in or redistributing critical resources (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). At the time of the accident, a new party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) had recently been voted into government for the first time. The DPJ initiated a regulation reform and a review of Japan’s energy strategy to phase out nuclear power. Meanwhile, an independent investigation committee unearthed evidence that the “accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO” (NAIIC, 2012, p. 16), effectively reframing the accident an internal shock caused by actions of the dominant pro-nuclear coalition. This learning and reframing process mobilized citizens and international actors, such as the IAEA, who helped push through the DPJ proposal for an independent safety agency. In contrast, the public and international actors remained divided about the nuclear phase out proposal, allowing the dominant coalition to eventually take over again. Thus, the paper concludes that reframing the nuclear accident as an internal shock (driven by political dynamics) rather than an external shock (an unanticipated, unpreventable natural disaster) put blame on the dominant coalition, allowing an ad-hoc coalition of change agents to push reforms through. The findings are particularly relevant for scholars studying environmental issues, because framing a pollution-related incident as internal versus external can make the difference between change and continuity. They also highlight the need for the ACF to consider framing of shocks in explaining policy change, particularly with regard to environmental hazards as shocks. NAIIC (2012) The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC). Executive Summary. Available at: http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf (Accessed: 23 October 2016). Sabatier, Paul A. and Weible, Christopher M. (2007) ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications’, in Sabatier, P.A. (ed.) Theories of the policy process, 2nd edn. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 189–220.