A host of empirical studies document accountability-seeking behaviour of public agencies. Possible rationales for such behaviour include compensating for the inadequacy of traditional accountability arrangements (Schillemans, 2011), attempts at pre-empting stricter mandatory provisions, logic of appropriateness motives (Koop, 2014), and reputational and legitimacy considerations (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016, 2017). As public agencies seek accountability through different instruments and towards different types of audiences, it is not very plausible that a single logic drives all accountability-seeking behaviour.
However, this variation in terms of “how?” and “to whom?” has been neglected so far in the literature. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the link between motivational drivers of accountability-seeking behaviour and the audiences targeted by voluntary accounts in the case of European Union (EU) agencies. Theoretically, the paper contributes to bureaucratic reputation theory as it shows that EU agencies adjust their strategies aimed at enhancing accountability and legitimacy to the targeted audience (Busuioc & Rimkutė, 2019).
Based on an analysis of a novel dataset consisting of 12 semi-structured interviews and over 50 open-ended survey answers, the paper demonstrates that the motivation behind accountability-seeking behaviour differs depending on the targeted audience. Preliminary results show that the main motivator behind accountability-seeking behaviour towards the wider public (e.g., the media and EU citizens) is the perceived need to highlight organizational successes and positive results (see Busuioc & Lodge, 2017, p. 98). In contrast, functional motivations like ensuring effective policy implementation and informational needs are more often mentioned in the context of accountability-seeking towards specific audiences such as interest groups and firms (see Arras & Braun, 2018). Finally, EU agencies seek accountability towards their principals (i.e., European Parliament, European Commission and the Council) primarily because of their dependence on political support and endorsements from those institutions (see Busuioc & Lodge, 2016, p. 255).
References
Arras, S., & Braun, C. (2018). Stakeholders Wanted! Why and How European Union Agencies Involve Non-State Stakeholders. Journal of European Public Policy, 25, 1257-1275. doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1307438
Busuioc, E.M., & Lodge, M. (2016). The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability. Governance, 29, 247-263. doi:10.1111/gove.12161
Busuioc, E.M., & Lodge, M. (2017). Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation. Public Administration Review, 77, 91-100. doi:10.1111/puar.12612
Busuioc, E.M., & Rimkutė, D. (2019). The Promise of Bureaucratic Reputation Approaches for the Eu Regulatory State. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-14. doi:10.1080/13501763.2019.1679227
Karsten, N. (2015). Scrutinize Me, Please! The Drivers, Manifestations and Implications of Accountability-Seeking Behaviour. Public Administration, 93, 684-699. doi:10.1111/padm.12164
Koop, C. (2014). Theorizing and Explaining Voluntary Accountability. Public Administration, 92, 565-581. doi:10.1111/padm.12058
Schillemans, T. (2011). Does Horizontal Accountability Work? Evaluating Potential Remedies for the Accountability Deficit of Agencies. Administration & Society, 43, 387–416.
