Earmarking, staffing and control of international organizations

Earmarking of contributions to international organizations (IOs) by member states has gained prominence as a means of not only supporting specific causes but also exerting control over these organizations. Yet, while earmarked funds serve donor priorities, they constrain IOs' flexibility and autonomy. This paper investigates under what circumstances donors relinquish or reduce earmarking. It posits that when donors possess alternative channels of influence over IOs, they are more inclined to donate without constraints. Analyzing a novel dataset on earmarked funding by OECD-DAC donors to international organizations alongside original data on staffing in United Nations agencies, this study examines the relationship between donor staffing within IOs and the stringency of earmarking. By scrutinizing the staffing mechanism's impact on earmarking decisions, this paper demonstrates that increased national representation within IO staff correlates with decreased earmarking stringency. Surprisingly, this effect extends beyond policy staff to non-policy roles. These findings suggest a nuanced trade-off between donor influence avenues, informing debates on optimizing donor control over IOs.