The Stabilizing and Destabilizing Effect of Subnational Governance in Autocracies

Abstract

What we have seen after the third wave of democratization ebbed away is that still a remarkable (and even growing) number of autocracies exist, covering a brought variance of regime types (see Croissant/ Wurster 2013), government structures (Schedler 2002, 2006; Gandhi 2008) and legitimation strategies (Kailitz 2013). Looking deeper into this (new) world of autocracies we can find a considerable number of autocratic regimes that differ in systematic ways from the classical image of a stringent hierarchical dictatorship. In addition to vertical steering, these regimes seem to resort to different forms of horizontal, collaborative governance of state and non-state actors (Kropp/ Schuhmann 2016) and (limited) competition in particular on the regional level. The mix of “horizontal” and “vertical” governance in an autocratic context (Davies 2011, 57) raises the questions of why autocratic rulers accept restrictions of their power and what effects on regime stability these new forms of autocratic governance have. We think it is timely to ask the following questions and find answers to them: What factors account for the specific mix of new competition strategies and collaborative approaches pursued by autocracies? How does the use of new forms of governance and competition change the structure of autocratic systems and what change in the logic of the processes of rule appears? What effect does regional competition has on the sustainability of autocratic rule? Do similar structures of autocratic governance replicate themselves at subnational levels?